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HAS THE COURT LEFT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEHIND?-THE BAZELON-KATZENBACH LETTERS ON
POVERTY, EQUALITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE

By YALE KAmisAR*

We promise according to our hopes,
and perform according to our fears.
La Rochefoucauld
Distribution of the first preliminary draft of the proposed
American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure last June touched off a brisk exchange of letters between
Chief Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, who maintained that
the proposed code left a good deal to be desired, and Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, who, although he did not
explicitly treat any provision of the preliminary draft, sharply
challenged the conception of equality underlying Bazelon's criticism of it. By now, both the code, and the Bazelon-Katzenbach
correspondence which it evoked, are surely among the most
widely read and discussed "confidential" documents of our time.1
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Prof. Kamisar expresses indebtedness to his colleagues, Profs. Paul Carrington, Douglas Kahn, Arthur Miller and Theodore St. Antoine, for valuable criticism of portions of the manuscript.
I This paper appraises the differing views of Judge Bazelon and the Attorney General on equality of treatment and the administration of criminal
justice, views advanced in the course of a "debate" growing out of the judge's
criticism of the aforementioned first preliminary draft of the American Law
Institute project. It does not purport to appraise, as such, the A.L.I. reporters'
proposals. It is clear from the Bazelon-Katzenbach correspondence itself, set forth
in appendices to this paper, that copies of the judge's letter to the Attorney
General, dated June 16, 1965, and of the General's reply, dated June 24, 1965,
were sent "to the interested people at the American Law Institute" (presumably the four reporters and thirty-eight advisers to the project) and to others
with whom the judge had "discussed this problem from time to time." The letters
were "leaked" to the Washington, D. C. Evening Star, on August 4, 1965, where
they were first published in full. They were then the subject of extensive discussion in much of the nation's press.
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How the Attorney General fared in academic circles remains
to be seen (the letters of Professor Anthony Amsterdam of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Dean A. Kenneth Pye
of the Georgetown University Law Center serve as evidence that
his letter met something less than unrestrained enthusiasm in
these quarters) ;2 that the General fared well in the mass media is
plain. Whether he enhanced his considerable stature as a student
of constitutional-criminal procedure is for you to judge; that he
displayed great skills as a debater cannot be denied.
Within the four corners of his letter, the Attorney General
appears to be a moderate, reasonable man responding somewhat
impatiently to an insatiable "liberal," to an extremist, if you will.
On rereading the letter to which he is supposed to be replying,
however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Attorney
General did not respond to the points raised by Judge Bazelon as
much as he evaded them; that he did not refute Bazelon as much
as he drastically changed the terms of the debate, then proceeded
quite nicely on his own terms.
Judge Bazelon centers much of his criticism of the code on
its failure to provide counsel during the earliest phases of the
criminal process:
[T]he proposed Code permits a suspect to retain counsel
during interrogation but it deliberately fails to provide counsel
for those too ignorant or inex-perienced to understand their
3
rights and their need for counsel.... In the teeth of Gideon,
4
6
Griffin, Coppedge,5 and Hardy, the Reporter's Commentary
argues that [the aforementioned proposal does not work] an
invidious discrimination between rich and poor on the ground
that the state has no "affirmative obligation to insure that
persons incustody will not incriminate themselves" but rather
that "the state must remain neutral" (pp. 281-32). But the
proposed police detention and interrogation are not "neutral"
2 Letter from Prof. Anthony G. Amsterdam to Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
July 2, 1965; letter from Dean A. Kenneth Pye to Prof. James Vorenberg, Reporter,
A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, July 7, 1965. Prof. Amsterdam's letter is set forth in appendix C to this paper. Since Dean Pye's letter is in
the main a fairly detailed criticism of the confidential first preliminary draft by
one of the project's advisers, a criticism which evoked an unpublished reply by
Prof. Vorenberg, it is not set forth in an appendix, but it is on file in the University of Kentucky and University of Michigan law libraries.
3Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
r Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
GHardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
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state acts. Their primary effect, unless counsel is provided, is
to elict damaging admissions from suspects. .... If the state
subjects all suspects to detention and interrogation, it is only
a pretense of "neutrality" to permit those able to retain
counsel to protect their rights effectively while refusing to
provide equal protection to the poor and inexperienced.7
The Attorney General responds as if Judge Bazelon were
philosophizing about "equal justice" at large, as a brooding
omnipresence, when in fact the judge is talking about it in the
specific context of the availability of counsel-"by far the most
pervasive" of all the defendant's rights "for it affects his ability to
assert any other rights he may have" 8-at a crucial stage of the
criminal process. The Attorney General responds as if Judge
Bazelon were urging the state to eliminate all the subtle and
personal "inequalties" which disadvantage some suspects and defendants-indeed eliminate all the inequalities which disadvantage
some citizens whether or not they happen to affect the criminal
process-when in fact Judge Bazelon is making a much more
modest claim, to wit, that there is persuasive, if not controlling,
authority that once the rich man is entitled to the assistance of
defense counsel in the police station the poor man should not have
to face his interrogators alone, should not have to shift for himself. But let the Attorney General speak for himself:
The poor are disadvantaged in many ways as against the rich;
the ignorant as against the educated; the sick as against the
healthy; etc. To what extent and by what means legal processes should take into account such inequalities raises difficult
questions. I would suppose the answers, insofar as we can discover them, lie in other values which are sought within our
system....
I do not believe that regulation through judicial decision or
statute of investigatory procedures should have as its purpose
to remedy all the inequalities which may exist in our society
as a result of social and economic and intellectual differences
to the exclusion of all other purposes and values sought to be
achieved in the criminal process. I do not believe that any
decision of the Supreme Court, nor of any Court of Appeals,
has been explicitly based on such a premise of equality. 9
"App. A, p. 487, infra.
8
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1,

8 (1956).

9 App. B, pp. 490-91, infra.
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The underlying assumption of Judge Bazelon's approach is
that if a code lets retained counsel into the interrogation roomas does the A.L.I. proposal-then the "equality" principle pervading Gideon, Griffin, and other cases requires devising systems
to enable members of the public defender's staff or other assigned
counsel to enter, too. Although I happen to agree with Judge
Bazelon, the merits of this issue are debatable. The trouble is that
the Attorney General does not debate them. He does not attempt
to distinguish away the "fourteenth amendment equality" cases in
the setting of police interrogation. He prefers to talk about
equality at large, in general.
Judge Bazelon is unimpressed with the argument that if the
state permits counsel in the interrogation room but does not "affirmatively insure" counsel for the indigent at this stage, it remains "neutral." His rejection of this reasoning is reminiscent
of court-appointed counsel's successful argument in Griffin v.
Illinois:
Illinois law provides generally for appellate review of all
criminal convictions, but includes no procedure by which an
indigent defendant, except one sentenced to death, can secure
without cost the transcript which is indispensable to full
appellate review.
As Mr. justice Jackson stated in his concurring opinion in
Edwards v. California, 814 U.S. 160, 184-85, in which the
Court struck down a California statute making it a crime to
bring, or assist in bringing, an "indigent" into that State:
"'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a
basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds
is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color."
[H] ere, the indigent is prejudiced. His lack of funds deprives
him of a substantial right which the state accords to others
with funds. Indigence is not neutral; it is the critical fact, the
very basis upon which defendants such as these petitioners are
prevented from securing the benefits of full appellate review
of their conviction.1"
The Attorney General's reply to Judge Bazelon, is, in turn,
reminiscent of the dissent in the Griffin case, where Mr. Justice
Harlan scored the notion that a state must "alleviate the conse10 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 29-30, 32, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

HeinOnline -- 54 Ky. L.J. 467 1965-1966

KENumCY LAw JoxmNVo

[Vol. 54,

quences of differences in economic circumstances that exist
wholly apart from any state action."" The Attorney General's
reasoning is even more redolent of the same Justice's dissent in
Douglas v. California, where balking at the extension of the
"fourteenth amendment equality" approach to require furnishing
counsel, as well as a transcript, on appeal, Mr. Justice Harlan
maintained:
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform
basis is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the
indigent. Yet I take it that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to
charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the purchase
of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard
fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for
various categories of offenses. Nor could it be contended that
the States may not classify as crimes acts which the poor are
more likely to commit than are the rich.
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less
fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause
does not impose on the States "an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances" . . . . The State may have a moral obligation to

eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the
Clause to give to some whatever others
Equal Protection
12
can afford.
Justice Harlan's argument is not without its force. But it did
not prevail in either the 1956 Griffin case or the 1963 Douglas
case. In some circumstances, at least, the Court has now made
plain, fourteenth amendment equality does impose "an affirmative
duty" on the states "to lift the handicaps flowing from differences
in economic circumstances," does require the states "to give to
some whatever others can afford." If fourteenth amendment
equality demands so much at trial or on appeal, why does it require so little in the interrogation room? This is the issue Judge
Bazelon unsuccessfully asks the Attorney General to face.
Why did Justice Harlan's argument fail in Griffin and Douglas?
I take it because a majority of the Court was convinced that
"basic legal services are not of the same order, in our theory of
11 Id. at 34.
12 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963).
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government, as basic medical services,"' 3 to say nothing of free
tuition at a state university, or free use of water from a municipal corporation. I take it because a majority of the Court shared
the views so well articulated by the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice:
[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with the problems of poverty in the administration of criminal justice does
not rest or depend upon some hypothetical obligation of
government to indulge in acts of public charity. It does not
presuppose a general commitment on the part of the federal
government to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of limited means, whenever or however manifested.
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on
wholly different considerations and reflects principles of much
more limited application. The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report is concerned arise in
a process initiatedby government for the achievement of basic
governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has as
one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities
on the persons proceeded against. . . . When government
chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area, its obligation
is surely no less than that of taking reasonable measures to
eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the law but which, neverthless, may occasionally affect
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While
government may not be required to relieve the accused of his
poverty, it may properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of justice. 14
I take it, further, that Justice Harlan's views in Griffin and
Douglas did not prevail because although difficult borderline
cases in the application of the "equality" norm to the criminal
process will necessarily arise, the availability of a transcript on
appeal or of counsel at trial or on appeal are not among them,
are well within the border. I take it that Justice Harlan's views
did not prevail because whatever may be said for more petty
"inequalities" or for more subtle, elusive "inequalities" which
the Court feels powerless to eliminate, the "inequalities" which
13 Willcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth
Amendment,
43 Cornell L.Q. 1, 16 (1957).
14 Attorney General's Committee, Report on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 9 (1963). (The committee, often called "the
Allen Committee," after its chairman Prof. Francis A. Allen, was appointed by
Mr. Katzenbach's predecessor, Robert F. Kennedy.)
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"disadvantaged" Griffin and Douglas were sufficiently real and
tangible, and the consequence which flowed from them sufficiently
important, to cause a majority of the Court to seek to correct them.
Why, then, should Justice Harlan's views prevail in the interrogation room? Is the right to counsel less important, less desirable, or less tangible there than at trial or on appeal? This is
the debate which Judge Bazelon launched, but the Attorney General avoided.
Because it permits a suspect to enjoy the assistance of counsel
during interrogation but fails to provide counsel at this stage
for those who cannot afford it, "the proposed Code," contends
Judge Bazelon, "would in practice diverge greatly from the ideal
that the administration of criminal justice should avoid invidious
discrimination based on wealth."' 5 Of course, this ideal is what
Gideon, Griffin and Douglas are all about.
"It would be ridiculous to state," replies the Attorney General, "that the overriding purpose of any criminal investigation
is to insure equal treatment."'16 Indeed it would-or to state that
its overriding purpose is to insure due process, or to forbid
illegal arrests or to prevent coercive interrogations-but who has
asserted this? It would be ridiculous to state that the overriding
purpose of public transportation or public education or service
in the armed forces is "equal treatment". But it does not follow
that such treatment is irrelevant or even unimportant, or that
segregation on public buses or in the classroom or in the Army
therefore is defensible.
Unfortunately, some of the press chose to highlight this vacuous
turn in the debate. The Wall Street journal recently summarized
the Bazelon-Katzenbach exchange as follows: "Judge Bazelon
argued that equality should be the chief consideration [of criminal
justice]. [He did not, but the Attorney General implied that he
had.] Mr. Katzenbach countered that law enforcement, not
equality, is the overriding purpose of any criminal investiga1
tion." 7
I say the debate took a vacuous turn because here, as elsewhere, it is not profitable to talk in terms of either/or. If the
15 App. A, p. 488, infra.
16 App. B, p. 490, infra.
"7Green, Crime and Punishment: Prosecutors Complain Supreme Court
Rulings Hurt War on Criminals,Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 1, 12.
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decisions the Supreme Court has handed down in the last thirty
years signify anything, they mean that sometimes the main purpose
of a criminal investigation is overriden by fairness or equality of
procedure, by values and policies which do not contribute to
"police efficiency" in the narrow sense. Judge Bazelon maintains
that this is one of those times.
After all, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a majority of the
Court in Coppedge, did point out, alluding to Justice Schaefer's
famous Holmes Lecture of 1956,18 that "the methods we employ in
the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the
measures by which the quality of our civilization may be
judged."' 0 In this same case, the Chief Justice also called attention to "our duty to assure to the greatest degree possible...
equal treatment for every litigant before the bar. ' 20 True, the
Chief Justice made this point in the setting of a statutory framework for appeals. But why is the impact of the "equality norm"
any less when it is brought to bear on a statutory framework for
pre-arraignment procedures, let alone a model scheme of pre-arraignment procedures?
I noted a moment ago that the fact that insuring equal treatment is not the overriding purpose of a system does not legitimate
unequal treatment. Of course, just such "legitimation" has been
attempted in the past. For example, fifteen years ago, the argument ran, as one sociologist described it:
The Army is not motivated by racial prejudice, and segregation
is abhorrent to us. But unfortunately the Army is confronted
by a condition and a duty, and not a theory. . . . Now the
Army's duty is to fight battles and win wars. Therefore, the
Army must maintain morale in the ranks and use its manpower with maximum efficiency. . . . The Army must take
the country as it is. It must accept social patterns and keep
but it is not an instrument for social
abreast of changes,
2
experimentation. 1
At places, the Attorney General's letter-with respect to indigence, not race, of course-smacks a bit of this argument:
I8 Schaefer, supra note 8, at 26.
10 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
201d. at 446-47.
21 Kenworthy. The Case Against Army Segregation, Annals, May, 1951, p. 27.
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Poverty, ignorance, and instability produced by wretched
living conditions may make an individual's criminal acts more
susceptible to discovery and proof. But, I am sure you will
agree these same conditions are major causes of crime. So
long as they exist and lead an individual to victimize his
fellow citizens, government cannot and should not ignore
their effects during a criminal investigation....
The elimination of disabling discrimination is the primary goal
of the Poverty Program, the Civil Rights Act, and numerous
and expanding services in 2vocational
rehabilitation, school as2
sistance and medical care.
Nobody is suggesting that if a man is stupid enough to leave
his fingerprints on the murder weapon the police must ignore
this manifestation of his stupidity. Nor that if a man rapes somebody in Macy's window his instability cannot be taken into
account. Nor that if old tires on a get-away car blow out, the
defendant should be raised to the level of success of the rich
robber with new tires and acquitted in the name of equality.
The issue is not whether poverty, ignorance or instability
should be a substantive defense against criminal liability but
whether these factors should be permitted to inhibit the proper
and effective assertion of procedural rights once the criminal
process has begun. The issue is not whether we should give the
poor and ignorant so many points because they are poor and
ignorant, but whether, because they suffer from these deficiencies,
we should deprive them of rights and privileges they are entitled to
in the abstract. Presumably these rights and privileges manifest
goals and policies transcending the pursuit of alleged criminals.
The issue is not whether the government should ignore crime
caused by poverty and ignorance, but whether with respect to the
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination or the right
to counsel or the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, the government should exploit the influences of poverty
or ignorance-or seek to minimize them. The issue is whether,
once the administration of criminal justice has begun, the government "should take the country as it is."
At one point, in a passage which received little or no attention in the press, the Attorney General does take cognizance of
22

App. B, p. 492, infra.
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the fact that the pursuit of alleged criminals is or must be tempered by "outside" values and goals:
We limit both investigation and criminal prosecution in various
ways both to protect the innocent and the personal rights (for
example, privacy, freedom of movement and speech) we enjoy
in our society. It is entirely proper to limit what the police may
do in the course of an investigation, even if those limitations
result in some of the guilty avoiding conviction. For example,
we do not permit confessions to be tortured or beaten out of
people, rich or poor, not because such confessions are necessarily unreliable but because these things are incompatible
with decent law enforcement, and because-inevitably-the
rack would be used on the innocent as well as the guilty. All
this is obvious. But what may be forgotten is that each such
decision to impose a limitation involves a balance of the values
thus promoted
against the value of discovering those guilty of
23
crime.

We do not and should not permit confessions to be tortured
or beaten out of people, rich or poor. Fine, but nobody is debating that issue any more. Do we, should we, permit confessions
to be obtained from poor people, but not rich-and that will often
be the effect of permitting retained counsel in the interrogation
room, but not furnishing assigned counsel to those who cannot
afford it-by "playing on their emotions" and using other "psychological" techniques? By "sweettalk" or by the use of pretended
sympathy and other emotional appeals to establish a relationship
of rapport and confidence? By condemning the victim of the crime
or minimizing the seriousness of the offense? By cutting off any
protestation of innocence? By wearying the person with contradictions of his assertions or by repeated accusations of lying?2 4
231d.

24

at pp.

490-91.

See Arthur & Caputo, Interrogation for Investigators (1959); Dienstein,

Techniques for the Crime Investigator (1952); Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interroga-

tion and Confessions (1962); Mulbar, Interrogation (1951); O'Hara, Fundamentals
of Criminal Investigation (1956) passim. Numerous extracts from these manuals
may be found in Weisberg, Police Interrogationof Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, Police Power and Individual Freedom 155 (Sowle ed. 1962).
Although entitled to the assistance of retained counsel in withstanding these

interrogation techniques, it may well be that even most suspects who can afford
to hire counsel at later stages of the criminal process will be financially incapable
of commanding the presence of counsel in the hours immediately following arrest.
I have in mind the comments of a number of practising criminal lawyers, with
vhom I have discussed this matter, to the effect that they would charge handsomely for "dropping everything else' and rushing down to the police station in
(Continued on next page)
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This is the issue, or the cluster of issues, Bazelon and Katzenbach
are presumably debating. These are the practices the Attorney
General, by implication at least, is willing to permit.
What Judge Bazelon is complaining about is that when we
permit a suspect who can afford one to bring a lawyer into the
interrogation room but fail to provide counsel at the same stage
for those who cannot afford it, we insulate the rich, but not the
poor, against what Professor Amsterdam terms "the fear and coercive pressure of what the General euphemistically calls 'imaginative
and energetic investigatory questioning.' "25 The Attorney General
is not very sympathetic. "I have never understood," he confides
to Judge Bazelon:
why the gangster should be made the model and all others
raised, in the name of equality, to his level of success in suppressing evidence. This is simply the proposition that if some
can beat the rap, all must beat the rap. I see no reason to
distort the whole of the criminal process in this fashion
Because we cannot solve all crimes and convict all criminals
26
is no reason to release those guilty whom we can convict.
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

response to an arrestee's call, and that they would be sure to "keep the meter
running" while at the stationhouse. It may well be, then, that many persons who
are financially capable at most stages of the criminal process should be viewed
as "indigent" at the immediate post-arrest stage, i.e., eligible for stationhouse
counsel at government expense. "[Ploverty must be viewed as a relative concept
with the consequence that the poverty of accused must be measured in each case
by reference to the particular need or service under consideration .... A problem
of poverty arises for the system of criminal Justice when at any stage of the proceedings lack of means in the accused substantially inhibits or prevents the proper
assertion of a right or claim of right." Attorney General's Committee, Report on
Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 7-8 (1963).
How often retained counsel will be unable to "drop everything else," regardless of the fee the arrestee can pay, is a matter of considerable speculation. A study
of pre-Escobedo police practices in several mid-western cities does reveal that
retained counsel often do enter a case shortly after arrest and immediatelr confer
with their clients or are present when the case reaches the district attorney s office.
In Milwaukee, they may actually sit in on the police interrogation." LaFave, Arrest 393-94 (Remington ed. 1965).
Whether or not an attorney can usually make a personal appearance at the
police station, if an arrestee is afforded prompt access to his lawyer by telephone
and vice versa, it would seem that at the least an arrestee would often be able to
contact, or be contacted by, an attorney (or some lawyer associated with him)
and to consult briefly with him via telephone. This in itself would seem to give
the affluent interrogation "subject" a significant advantage over his indigent
counterpart. The former is likely to be fortified by (a) the knowledge that some
lawyer 'out there" is "working on" his case and (b) by emphatic, if summary.
legal and tactical advice from a professional devoted solely to the interests of
his client; the latter is dependent upon his captors-who obviously share the outlook and concur in the purposes of the prosecution-to wam him unbegrudgingly
and unequivocally of the very rights he may utilize to frustrate them.
25 See app. C., p. 497, infra.
26
App. B., p. 494, infra.
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"Beat the rap" has several connotations. To some, I suspect, it
signifies avoiding a due penalty by illegitimate means. (The
synonyms of "beat" include cheat, defraud, swindle, gyp, etc.)
This meaning of "beat the rap" is simply not relevant. Whatever
else Chief Judge Bazelon is guilty of, he cannot be charged with
seeking funds for the indigent so that he, too, may bribe judges
or prosecutors, so that he, too, may hire thugs to beat up witnesses
or intimidate jurors. This, nobody is advocating; nobody is debating. In the context of the Bazelon-Katzenbach correspondence,
"beat the rap" can only be shorthand-albeit hyperbolic shorthand-for avoiding a conviction despite ample evidence of guilt
by availing oneself of rights and privileges the Constitution, as the
Court interprets it, permits a defendant to invoke, e.g., refusing
to answer any questions, declining to take the witness stand, sup27
pressing illegally seized evidence.
Similarly, in the context of the Bazelon-Katzenbach correspondence, "gangster" can only be shorthand-albeit again emotive
shorthand-for a person who has the wealth, education or intelligence to fully avail himself of procedural protections the Constitution, as the Court reads it, entitles him to assert. Such a person
may well be a gangster; he may also be a prominent businessman
or a famous politician, or a leading surgeon or a college professor.
A subdued, expurgated version of Mr. Katzenbach's argument,
although lacking much of its original "punch," may further
analysis. I offer the following restatement of the General's position:
I have never understood why the wealthy, educated, intelligent
defendant should be made the model and all others raised, in
the name of equality, to his level of success in availing himself of procedural safeguards which the Constitution or
statutory law permits him to utilize. This is simply the proposition that if some defendants know their rights and have
the means to invoke them, all citizens should be given a like
opportunity to do so, to the extent reasonably possible. I see
no reason to distort the whole of the criminal process in this
27See Dean Pye's letter, supra note 2, at 8: "No one wants either the professional criminal or the guilty indigent to escape justice. No one suggests that

the overriding purpose of criminal investigation is to insure equal treatment.

What both Judge Bazelon and I suggest is that each citizen be entitled to the
rights guaranteed him by the Constitution and that these rights be implemented
by procedures which are meaningful. It is the denial of constitutional guarantees,
not the coincidence of inequality with the professional criminal, which is the
focal point of our dissent."
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fashion. Because some defendants possess sufficient intelligence or sufficient funds to avail themselves of "prophylactic"
or "deterrent" rules designed to discourage say, police interrogation methods which "offend" the Court, regardless of
whether they pose a threat to the reliability of the guiltdetermining process, or to discourage methods which create
a substantial risk that a person subjected to them would falsely
confess, regardless of whether this particular defendant did; or
because some defendants have sufficient intelligence or funds
to avail themselves of certain rights designed to insure other
values than the pursuit of truth, e.g., "privacy," "liberty" or
"dignity," (the laws of search and seizure are a good
example); and such fortunately endowed defendants may
thereby avoid being convicted of crimes they have probably
committed, is no reason to enable all defendants to do so.
I must confess I don't see why not. If we are willing to "free
guilty men" because they were the victims of "offensive" interrogation methods or because they were subjected to interrogation
techniques producing a substantial risk of unreliability, why are
these methods less offensive or less risky when the defendants are
poor or ignorant? If we are willing to sacrifice probative, trustworthy evidence when a defendant is rich enough to afford
counsel or sophisticated or hardened enough to know his rights,
why are these values less paramount and "the truth" more important when the fate of poor and ignorant defendants is at stake?
To the extent that the Constitution and statuory law entitles the
wealthy and educated to "beat the rap," if that's what you want to
call it, why shouldn't all defendants be given a like opportunity?
Moreover, how does affording all defendants such an opportunity distort the whole of the criminal process? Isn't it more accurate to say that it irons out the distortion? Isn't it fair to say
that the Attorney General is the one who is trying to preserve the
distortion?
The Attorney General has no qualms about protecting the
poor as well as the rich against brutal, violent interrogation
methods. I take it this is because, without regard to the "equality
norm," he accepts these decisions on the merits. For the same
reason, I am sure, he would not hesitate to give the poor and the
rich like opportunities to suppress evidence obtained in violation
of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Why
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then does he balk at applying the "equality norm" to the rich
man's insulation against "imaginative and energetic investigatory
questioning"?
He does so, I submit, because he is really against the rich man
having it. He is against the availability of counsel at this stage on
the merits. Without regard to the "equality norm" he would strike
the balance in favor of the right of the interrogator to proceed
against an unchampioned "subject." (The interrogation manuals
almost invariably refer to a suspect as the "subject." Sometimes
they even liken him to "game" to be stalked and cornered. It is
only after the suspect leaves the police station and reaches the
courtroom that he is rehumanized, and then, even dignified.) 28
True, the United States Supreme Court may have already
struck the balance the other way, in favor of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel in the interrogation
room. But these are the decisions, I take it the General has in
mind, when he charges:
[A]s the cases have presented more and more difficult
questions of fairness and propriety, I believe the judges have
left the public behind, and even among judges, the margins
of the consensus have been passed. The most basic investigatory methods have come to be questioned in the context of
specific cases and unique factual situations, rather than after
review of all of the considerations which might be thought
relevant in designing rules for the system as a whole 2 9
In context, it is difficult to see how the cases which "have left
the public behind" can be the "fourteenth amendment equality"
cases. The Douglas-Griffin line of cases deal with appellate procedures, not "basic investigatory methods." True, though written
in terms of due process, Gideon and other assigned counsel cases
28 [Editor's notej At this point in the delivery of the paper, Justice Walter
Schaefer, the panelist seated nearest Prof. Kamisar, turned to him and asked him
to amplify his thoughts on the proceedings in the police station. Thereupon,
Prof. Kamisar briefly sketched the contrasting conditions in the "mansion" (the
courtroom), where the Constitution requires so much, and in the "gatehouse"
(the police station), where, until very recently at any rate, it has meant so
little, a theme developed at considerable length in the professor's recently
published Magna Carta Essay, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . ..
in Kamisar, Inbau & Arnold, Criminal Justice in Our Time 1 (Howard ed.

1985).29

App. B, p. 491, infra.
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may also be viewed as "equal protection" cases, but to date none
have arisen in a setting any earlier than "arraignment" and
"preliminary hearings."' 0
The cases which push the right to counsel back to the point
of arrest, the cases which challenge "the most basic investigatory
methods," are undoubtedly Escobedo and Massiah.31 Both, however, involved defendants who could afford to, and did in fact,
retain counsel.
The underlying thrust of the Attorney General's response to
Judge Bazelon is this: putting defense counsel in the interrogation room will more or less "eliminate questioning" which, in
turn, will more or less cause "our system of prevention and deterrence [to be] crippled."3 2
This is something less than inexorable logic. For one thing
it seems to assume that the police will be unable to obtain any
incriminating statements from suspects on the street, in the squad
car, during the "booking period," or before counsel has arrived
at the police station. For another, it appears to collide violently
with the views advanced by the new Deputy Attorney General,
the very week the Bazelon-Katzenbach correspondence "leaked" to
the press, to the effect that:
People do not commit crime because they know they cannot
be questioned by police before presentment, or even because
they feel they will not be convicted. We as a people commit
crimes because we are capable of committing crimes. We
choose to commit crimes.33
Nor is the Attorney General's position easy to square with the
findings of New York Supreme Court Justice Nathan Sobel, pub30

White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.

52 (1961). However, White concerned the evidentiary use at trial of a subsequently withdrawn uncounseled plea of guilty at the arraignment stage, "a

problem not greatly different from the use at trial of an uncounseled confession
given to the police rather than to a judge." Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the
Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev.
47, 51 (1964).
81Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964). Both cases are discussed at length, with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, in Enker & Elsen, supra note 30; Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 Ohio St. L.J. 449 (1964); Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J.Grim. L.,
C. & P.S. 412 (1965); Sutherland, Crine and Confession, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 21
(1965). See also, Kamisar. supra note 28.
32See app. B. pp. 492-93, infra.

83 Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association, Miami Beach, Florida, August 9, 1965, pp. 2-3.
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lished only last November, to the effect that incriminating statements "constitute part of the evidence in less than ten per-cent of
all indictments," findings which led him to conclude that the
notion "that confessions are essential to conviction in any substantial number of cases is simply carelessly [or carefully?]
34
nurtured nonsense."
According to Judge Sobel:
[M] ost serious crimes are cleared by the factor-astonishing
to the uninformed-that in nearly all assaults; in 35 per cent
of robberies and in 45 per cent of forcible rapes, the protagonists-the victim and the perpetrator-were known to one
another priorto the commission of the crime. Even where not
known to one another, in a large percentage of these cases
there is positive identification.35 Thus, neither interrogation or
even investigation is essential.
As for homicides-where the victim is dead-the crime "prosecutors ...

usually point to ...

as dependent in a large percentage

of cases upon 'confessions,' " Judge Sobel tells us, "80 per cent of
all murders are committed within the family or among and
between 'friends' and therefore, the 'killer' is usually known if
' 6
indeed he does not turn himself in."
I do not claim that Judge Sobel's study is fool-proof. Indeed,
I doubt it. Moreover, his findings are based on only 1,000 in34Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions: A Legal
Perspective-A PracticalPerspective, Part Six, N.Y.L.J. 1, 4-5 (Nov. 22, 1965).
35 Id. at 5.

3 1bid.
37For one thing, Judge Sobel's findings do not take into account the number
of cases in which, although the confession is not offered itself, leads are obtained
which result in the discovery of physical evidence or witnesses. How often this
occurs is a matter of considerable dispute.
During the period covered by Judge Sobel, "nine murder indictments were
filed. In not a single instance was a 'confession' involved." Id. at 4. Shortly
after these findings wvere published, however, New York District Attorney Frank
S. Hogan offered conflicting figures of his own. He disclosed that of 91 homicide
cases pending in his count', confessions would be offered in 62, or 68% of the
cases and estimated that indictments could not have been obtained without a
confession in 25 cases, or 27%. Even this estimate, however, was reported to be
"considerably below those usually made by prosecutors and police officials."
Roberts, Confessions Held Crucial by Hogan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, pp. 1,
52.
A short two weeks later, the Chief of Detectives of the City of Detroit,
Vincent W. Piersante, revealed that in the nine months between January 20,
1965 (the date his department decided to notify suspects of their right to remain
silent and their right to retain counsel) and October 31, 1965, confessions were
obtained in 56.1% of homicide cases (as against 53.0% in 1961) but were
"essential" in only 9.3% of the cases (as oDuosed to 20.9% in 1961). Letter and
attached figures from Chief Vincent NV. Piersante to Jerold Israel, Professor of
(Continued on next page)
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dictments in one county, a self-styled "small sampling. ' 38 But
what findings has the Attorney General offered?
I share the Attorney General's concern that "in seeking to
achieve the freedom, security, legal and social justice that are at
stake in our conclusions" we do not "merely . . . draw out the
logic of unexamined assumptions. 8' 9 I also share Professor Amsterdam's fear, however, that "the Attorney General is selective in the
40
assumptions he will and those he will not examine."
"We are not so civilized," warns the Attorney General, "that
we can afford to abandon deterrence as a goal of our criminal
law." 41 Of course we are not. Of course we cannot afford to
"abandon deterrence." But who is debating this?
That the Attorney General would prefer to debate this issue
is understandable. It is much easier to come out against abolishing
the deterrent force of the criminal law than to establish that
adopting the changes your opponent advocates would bring about
such a result. And the General's issue-hopping met with success.
"Equality v. Deterrence." So ran the caption of the Time Magazine
story on the Bazelon-Katzenbach exchange. "What is the purpose
of U.S. criminal justice: Equal treatment for all who are accused
of crime or deterrence of crime?" 42 (Empahasis added.) So began
the story.
What if the Attorney General is quite right? What if the
presence of counsel in the interrogation room would spell catas(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

Law, University of Michigan, Dec. 17, 1965, on file in University of Michigan Law
Library.
In a subsequent telephone interview with Chief Piersante, he corroborated
what his study indicated: the importance of confessions "varies greatly, depending
upon the crime involved." For example, the chief maintained that the police
were "heavily dependent on confessions in burglary investigations" (the number
of confessions obtained in such investigations had dropped from 64.5% in 1961
to 32.4% in 1965; confessions were deemed "essential" in 24.3% of the 1965
cases as opposed to 53.2% in 1961), whereas recent confession-right to counsel
cases had bad "very little impact" on murder investigations, probably because his
departments pre-arrest investigatory procedures were especially effective and
thorough with respect to this crime.
as These are the first 1,000 indictments in Kings County since January 7,
1965, the date the New York Court of Appeals required prosecutors to serve a
"notice of intention" upon the defense if they propose to use confessions.

In

Kings County, at least, "the 'notice of intention' is filed immediately after indictment irrespective of whether the case will be ultimately disposed of by plea
or trial." Sobel, supra note 34, at 4.
89

40

41
4

See app. B, p. 494, infra.

See app. C. p. 496, infra.

See app. B, p. 492. infra.
2 Time, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 41.
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trophe for our system of prevention and deterrence? This is a
good reason for shutting the rich man's lawyer out of the interrogation room, but is it a good reason for letting him in and doing
nothing about providing counsel for the poor man?
By implication, at least, the Attorney General appears to be
defending a system which permits a suspect who can afford counsel
to bring him into the interrogation room, but which goes no
further. Isn't the whole thrust of his letter misdirected? Shouldn't
he be attacking such a system for going too far?
The General scolds Bazelon for overlooking that "each decision
to impose a limitation [on law enforcement] involves a balance
of the values thus promoted against the values of discovering those
guilty of crime." 43 But it is he who overlooks that, with respect to
the man who can afford counsel, the system being assailed by
Judge Bazelon has already struck a balance in the interrogation
room-in favor of the suspect's "needs" and against law enforcement's "needs," if you will. In the main, Judge Bazelon takes it
from there.
The Judge's subsidiary point is that the resolution of the issue
is constitutionally required, but his chief argument, to paraphrase
the late Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Griffin (Bazelon does
not paraphrase him, I do), is that whether or not a state is constitutionally required to take the first step, once it does, once it
deems it so wise and just that suspects be permitted the assistance
of counsel in the interrogation room, it must also take the second
step; it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes, or may operate to preclude, indigent persons from securing
such a champion at the same time and place. 44 It would appear
that Mr. Katzenbach does not deem it wise and just to let counsel
into the interrogation room. This is to oppose the first step, not
the second.
Why didn't the Attorney General come right out and oppose
the first step? I take it because he is persuaded either that
Supreme Court precedent or the clamor of the bar or public
opinion precludes shutting retained counsel out of the interrogation room.
If public and professional opinion dictated his choice, then,
43 See app. B, p. 491, infra.
44 Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956).
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to paraphrase Justice Jackson: 45 There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than
to require that the poor be subjected to police interrogation in no
greater measure than the rich; that the protections extended to
the favored few be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow officials to
pick and choose only the less fortunate to be the subjects of
secret and sustained police interrogation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if all segments of society were so affected.
What if the Attorney General felt constrained by the Constitution, as interpreted by the present Court, to accept the first
step? What if he agrees that Escobedo cannot fairly be read so
narrowly as to shut retained counsel out of the interrogation
room? Then, in effect, he concedes that with respect to the rich
man, arguments for an "interrogation opportunity"-arguments
largely from "necessity"-have not or will not persuade the Court,
have been or will be overriden by competing values and policies.
At this point, I submit, it is impermissible for the General to
contain the impact of what he probably considers a bad decision
by weighing de novo the same values the Court weighed, and this
time striking the balance against the generality of suspects. Indigence is not a convenient valve for reducing the impact of a
decision the government opposes on the merits.46 This, I take it,

is what "equal protection" for rich and poor is all about.
I do not deny there may be legitimate reasons for not applying the equality norm to "a process whose contours have already
been shaped" for the financially capable.4 7 I only contend that

disliking the way the process has been shaped is not one of them.
Application or non-application of the equality norm, I think it
plain, must rest on analysis and reasons quite transcending approval or disapproval of the original decision, must be judged by
"neutral principles," if you will. 48

45 Cf. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)
(concurring
opinion).
4

6Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 450 (1962).
7 Cf. PackerTwo Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 19
(1964).
48 Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 15, 17, 19 (1959), reprinted in Selected Essays on Constitutional
Law 463, 472, 474, 475 (1963).
4
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What are some of the "legitimate reasons" for not applying the
"equality norm" to a given process? I suggest the following factors:
(1) Financial, manpower and logistic problems may be insurmountable.
(2) The disparity may not be substantial or vital. For example, the argument may be made that counsel need not be
furnished to an indigent attacking a judgment collaterally because the assistance of counsel at trial and at every level of appellate review has reduced the possibility of error to the barest
49
minimum.
(3) The maximum adverse consequences may be trivial. For
example, the argument may be made that for this reason counsel
need not be furnished to an indigent charged with spitting on the
sidewalk or burning leaves without a permit or overparking.50 In
the case of simple traffic offenses the vast number of such violations would also bring factor (1) into play.
(4) The differences may be too elusive and subtle. This is
one of the reasons that once minimal standards of competency are
satisfied, we do not measure assigned counsel's performance against
that of the best retained counsel. Factor (1) is certainly important here, too.
I venture to say that the Attorney General does not resist application of the "equality norm" for any of the reasons or kinds
of reasons suggested above. At least he has not advanced any of
these reasons. Indeed, he resists the pressure for "equality" not on
the ground that counsel in the interrogation room is unimportant,
but for the reason that it is too important.
In fairness to the Attorney General, he does make an ingenious
argument for the proposition that the gap between the rich
suspect who can afford to hire counsel and the poor man who cannot is really quite minimal:
[W]hen any crime is in issue those who have respectability at
stake, and who could have a lawyer at their command, cannot
afford to appear guilty. Galling a lawyer for protection from
investigation, or refusing to answer questions, does often give
the appearance of guilt, and as a consequence the rich will
49See Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field

Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 9-13 (1963).

GO See id. at 62-88.
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often talk, and, if guilty, will often provide incriminating evidence. 51
Now, it turns out, the suspect who has a lawyer at his command is not likely to be a gangster after all, but rather a
respectable rich man.
"As a consequence the rich will often talk." What are the
underlying assumptions at work here? That most men "who
could have a lawyer at their command" are respectable whereas
most men who could not have a lawyer at their command are
not? That respectable men suspected of murder will not call a
lawyer for protection (somebody forgot to tell Dr. Sheppard
about this), but unrespectable men would-if they could? What
was it the General said about not drawing out "the logic of unexamined assumptions"?
We can permit the rich man to enjoy the benefit of counsel
in the interrogation room because quite often he won't avail himself of it. But we cannot make counsel available to the poor man
at this stage because too often he will assert this right. So the
argument, as I understand it, runs. The General's felt need to harmonize the apparent disparity in treatment between rich and poor
at this early stage is commendable, but I do not believe he succeeds.
A FINAL PRFLECTION

You will recall from the Book of Acts that when a crowd
demonstrated against the Apostle Paul:
The chief captain commanded him to be brought into the
castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging;
that he might know wherefore they cried so against him.
And as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the centurion that stood by, Is it lawful for you to scourge a man
that is a Roman and uncondemned?
When the centurion heard that, he went and told the chief
captain, saying, Take heed what thou doest; for this man is
a Roman.
Then straightway they departed from him . .. and the chief
captain also was afraid, after he knew that [Paul] was a
Roman, and because he had bound him.5 2
51 See
52

app. B, pp. 493-94, infra.
Acts 22:23 (King James).
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There is no indication that either the chief captain or the
centurion ever wondered: Why do we use the lash to extort confessions from any person under Roman rule? Is it because such
methods are necessary or simply that they are familiar? If the lash
is necessary, why don't we use it against all prisoners, Romans as
well?
Many centuries later, in Cleveland, Ohio, when approached by
officials who suspected him of murdering his wife, a man of
wealth and distinction sought to take advantage of his "Roman
citizenship." He submitted to questioning only when his family
and attorneys agreed that he might. At one point he cited "his
present emotional condition and his present state of fatigue" as
good cause for not being subjected to further interrogation. After
consulting his attorneys, he declined to take either a lie detector
test or a "truth serum" injection.53 But the public, at least the
press, did not draw back afraid.
"Why all of this sham, hypocrisy, politeness, criss-crossing of
pomp and protocol in this case?" asked the -Cleveland Press. "In
the background of this case," protested the Press, "are ... hired
lawyers [and] a husband who ought to have been subjected instantly to the same third-degree to which any other person under
similar circumstances is subjected." 54
Can it be said that the reaction to Dr. Sheppard's assertion of
his "Roman citizenship" marks progress over the reaction to the
Apostle Paul's assertion? In a way, yes. This time, at least, the
disparity in treatment between Romans and the generality of
suspects did not go unnoticed. This time, although the wrong
answers were suggested, at least questions were asked.
I am confident that if we ask enough questions about these
matters, the right answers will emerge. The only thing we have to
fear is that, like the Romans of old, we will simply assume that
we already have the answers, that what is familiar is what is
right.5
53 See generally Holmes, The Sheppard Murder Case 89-48 (Bantam Books
ed. 1962), and newspaper reports collected therein.
64 Cleveland Press, July 20, 1954, p. 1.
"The "insulated chambers afforded by the several States" are sometimes an
advantage. But they may be too well insulated. Someone once wisely said that the
basic trouble with judges is not that they are incompetent or venal beyond other
men; it is just that the, get used to it. And it is easy indeed to get used to a
particular procedural system. What is familiar tends to become what is right.
Schaefer, supra note 8, at 7.
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Chambers of
David L. Bazelon
Chief Judge

June 16, 1965

Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Katzenbach:
In light of our recent discussions about the administration of
criminal justice, it was with particular interest that I read your very
fine speech to the University of Chicago Alumni. You have rightly
pointed to the needs to examine how theoretical legal rights work in
practice and to "re-evaluate the divergence of ideal and practice."
In line with this concern, I believe you may share my misgivings
about Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Preliminary Draft Number 1 of the proposed American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure.
The Code proposes twenty-minute detention of a citizen to "aid in
the investigation or prevention of a crime" and dragnet arrests where
"it is likely that only one or more but not all of the persons arrested
may be guilty of the crime." The Code also approves police questioning of a suspect from four to twenty-four hours after his arrival
at a police station. These provisions would, in my experience, primarily affect the poor and, in particular, the poor Negro citizen. I
doubt that police would, for example, arrest and question the entire
board of directors of a company suspected of criminal anti-trust
violations although it might be 'likely that only one or more but not
all... may be guilty of a crime." It is not apparent to me, however,
that prosecuting authorities have had notable success in detecting or
combatting such "white collar crimes" as anti-trust violations or tax
frauds. I cannot understand why the crimes of the poor are so much
more damaging to society as to warrant the current hue and cryreflected in the proposed Code-for enlarging police powers which
primarily are directed against those crimes.
It is also likely that, in some instances, professionals who engage
in organized crime may be held and questioned by police. But these
suspects know their rights and counsel is ordinarily available to them.
Thus the discriminatory working of the proposed Code is most
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graphically revealed in the provisions regarding availability of counsel
during police interrogation.
The proposed Code permits a suspect to retain counsel during
interrogation but it deliberately fails to provide counsel for those
who cannot afford it, or for those too ignorant or inexperienced to
understand their rights and their need for counsel. The Code provides
that retained counsel may be present during police interrogation,
though the Reporter suggests, as an alternative proposal, that retained
counsel may be excluded from the interrogation though he would be
permitted to consult with his client prior to the interrogation.
In the teeth of Gideon, Griffin, Coppedge and Hardy, the Reporter's
Commentary argues that neither proposal regarding counsel works
an invidious discrimination between rich and poor on the ground that
the state has no "affirmative obligation to insure that persons in
custody will not incriminate themselves" but rather that the "state
must remain neutral." (pp. 231-32) But the proposed police detention
and interrogation are not "neutral" state acts. Their primary effect,
unless counsel is provided, is to elicit damaging admissions from
suspects. (The Commentary suggests that detention and interrogation may also permit the suspect to exculpate himself. But the
presence of counsel would aid rather than inhibit this purpose.) If
the state subjects all suspects to detention and interrogation, it is only
a pretense of "neutrality" to permit those able to retain counsel to
protect their rights effectively while refusing to provide equal protection to the poor and inexperienced.
The Code's alternative proposal-that retained counsel be excluded
from the interrogation-would partially eliminate one blatant discrimination between rich and poor by impeding the ability of the
rich to protect their rights. But a major distinction between rich and
poor would remain: those who could afford it would have some
support from counsel; the poor have none.
In any event, elimination or curtailment of counsel's role in the
interrogation procedures raises grave doubts about the fairness of those
procedures. The source of these doubts is revealed in the Commentary's rationale for the Code's refusal to appoint counsel during
police interrogation:
the expenditure of large public funds is not justified to assure that in
all cases in-custody interrogation can be effective only for the purposes
of exculpation and never for inculpation. (p. 228, emphasis supplied.)

The clear premise of this argument is that no one, if advised by counsel,
would volunteer inculpatory statements. Since the Commentary cannot assume that counsel would coerce a suspect to remain silent, I
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think this argument is an implicit admission that counsers presence
militates against the confusion or fear or insufficient understanding of
his rights which prompt a suspect to speak.
Indeed, the Commentary itself admits that the "atmosphere [of a
police station] tends to be one of confusion and indeterminacy" (p.
207) and it is, I think, coercive to many who are accustomed to view
the police as hostile. In such atmosphere, the Code's intricate provisions for police warning of rights will be ineffective. Counsel, unlike
the police, has no transparent interest in eliciting self-incrimination,
and he ordinarily is more detached and knowledgeable than a relative
who may, according to the Code, be present or consulted during
interrogation. Since the Code refuses counsel to those most likely to
be detained and interrogated, its claims ring hollow that "the
suspect retains a meaningful choice as to whether and how much he
will cooperate in the inquiry" (p. 186) and that it "provide[s] equal
access [for rich and poor?] to sufficient information to make choice
meaningful." (p. 214)
Moreover, these Code provisions fail to take account of a vital
consideration set out by the Allen Committee in its Report on Poverty
and the Administration of FederalCriminalJustice:
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of
our system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends
upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions
and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. The proper
performance of the defense function is thus as vital to the health of
the system as the performance of the prosecuting and adjudicatory
functions. It follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused
impedes vigorous and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the
viability of the adversary system. (Report, at p. 10.)

The police interrogation procedure approved by the Code requires
"constant, searching, and creative questioning" to insure its fairness
and even its compliance with the elaborate Code provisions. The
Code's failure to see the need for counsel "at all stages" of the criminal
process is at sharp variance with the philosophy of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, and with the Allen Report and the policies of the
Department of Justice which led to that landmark Act.
The proposed Code would in practice diverge greatly from the
ideal that the administration of criminal justice should avoid invidious
discrimination based on wealth. But the Code and the Reporter's
Commentary fail to follow your injunction in the University of Chicago
speech: that we must "admit what we are doing . .. not merely for

the sake of symmetry, but for the sake of social honesty,-and, indeed,
for the sake of better controlling crime." I hope you share my concern,
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and I welcome your comments in the same spirit of open-minded
investigation which characterized your University of Chicago speech
and our recent conversations.
'Unless you see some objection, I would like to furnish a copy of
this letter to some of those with whom I have discussed this problem
from time to time and to the interested people at the American Law
Institute.
Cordially,
David G. Bazelon
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APpNmmix B
OFFICE OF TAE ATroRNEY GENERAL
WAsHiNGTON, D. C.

June 24, 1965
Honorable David L. Bazelon
Chief Judge
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
United States Courthouse
Washington, D. C
Dear Judge Bazelon:
The kind reference in your recent letter to my remarks in Chicago
was most gratifying. I am happy you agree that we cannot continue
public discussion of problems in the administration of the criminal
law without recognizing our actual practices and inquiring into the
reasons for them. A viable resolution of the issues we face is indeed
possible only if we pull all the considerations into the open and
honestly attempt to balance the competing goals of our society.
The underlying assumption of your approach appears to be some
conception of equality. No one, of course, would argue with "equal
justice under law" or any other formulation. Nor do I propose to
argue that purely formal conceptions of equality may have unequal
impact in law as they do in virtually every aspect of our life. The poor
are disadvantaged in many ways as against the rich; the ignorant as
against the educated; the sick as against the healthy; etc. To what
extent and by what means legal processes should take into account
such inequalities raises difficult questions. I would suppose the
answers, insofar as we can discover them, lie in other values which
are sought within our system. It would be ridiculous to state that the
overriding purpose of any criminal investigation is to insure equal
treatment. Obviously, criminal investigation is designed to discover
those guilty of crime. We limit both investigation and criminal
prosecution in various ways both to protect the innocent and the
personal rights (for example, privacy, freedom of movement and
speech) we enjoy in our society. It is entirely proper to limit what
the police may do in the course of an investigation, even if those
limitations result in some of the guilty avoiding conviction. For
example, we do not permit confessions to be tortured or beaten out
of people, rich or poor-not because such confessions are necessarily
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unreliable but because these things are incompatible with decent law
enforcement, and because-inevitably-the rack would be used on the
innocent as well as the guilty. All this is obvious. But what may be
forgotten is that each such decision to impose a limitation involves a
balance of the values thus promoted against the value of discovering
those guilty of crime.
In recent years we have taken steps to make the process fairer to
the poor-by providing counsel, by revising bail procedures, etc. But
in none of these efforts has equality been our overriding objectivenor should it be. We provide counsel in order to insure that the
innocent are not wrongly convicted, that they may raise defenses
which help preserve the integrity of the judicial process. We do it
for our sake, not for theirs. And we are providing bail procedures
because we believe that in many instances financial condition is
irrelevant to the purposes sought to be promoted by bail. Again, it
is not a welfare program, but one designed to better effectuate the
purposes of bail.
In short, I do not believe that regulation through judicial decision
or statute of investigatory procedures should have as its purpose to
remedy all the inequalities which may exist in our society as a result
of social and economic and intellectual differences to the exclusion
of all other purposes and values sought to be achieved in the criminal
process. I do not believe that any decision of the Supreme Court, nor
of any Court of Appeals, has been explicitly based on such a premise
of equality. The courts have been attempting, in the cases before
them, the same difficult balance of goals, a balance all the more difficult for lack of an adequate public and legislative discussion of the
issues.
In general, over the past quarter century, appellate decisions
marking off broad new areas of reform in criminal procedure have
gained public acceptance and the full support of law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and judges alike. But as the cases have presented
more and more difficult questions of fairness and propriety, I believe
the judges have left the public behind, and, even among judges, the
margins of the consensus have been passed. The most basic investigatory methods have come to be questioned in the context of
specific cases and unique factual situations, rather than after review
of all of the considerations which might be thought relevant in
designing rules for the system as a whole. As a result, policemen, district attorneys, and trial court judges have become increasingly unsure
of the law with respect to arrest and post-arrest procedures, often
differing vigorously among themselves. In your own court of appeals,
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the result is too often determined by the particular panel which hears
a case. Thus the consistency, the efficiency, and consequently the fairness of justice have suffered.
Your suggestion that police questioning will primarily affect the
poor and, in particular, the poor Negro, strikes me as particularly
irrelevant. The simple fact is that poverty is often a breeding ground
for criminal conduct and that inevitably any code of procedure is
likely to affect more poor people than rich people. For reasons beyond
their control, in Washington many poor people are Negroes; in Texas,
Mexicans; in New York City, Puerto Ricans. A system designed to
subject criminal offenders to sanctions is not aimed against Negroes,
Mexicans, or Puerto Ricans in those jurisdictions simply because it may
affect them more than other members of the community.
There are, of course, inequities in our society resulting from
differences in wealth, education, and background, and these inequities
are sometimes reflected in the outcome of the criminal process.
Poverty, ignorance, and instability produced by wretched living conditions may make an individual's criminal acts more susceptible to
discovery and proof. But, I am sure you will agree these same conditions are major causes of crime. So long as they exist and lead an
individual to victimize his fellow citizens, government cannot and
should not ignore their effects during a criminal investigation. Otherwise, so many persons guilty of crime would be insulated from conviction that our system of prevention and deterrence would be
crippled.
This would in fact increase the suffering of the less favored in our
society, for it is they who live in the high-crime areas and they who
are the usual victims of crime. Investigation is not a game. It is a
deadly serious public responsibility, whatever the crime. Losses and
injuries which may appear small are often crushing to the victims
involved. We are not so civilized that we can afford to abandon
deterrence as a goal of our criminal law.
Thwarting detection and prosecution would also close the door
to the rehabilitative correctional system, which is appropriately designed to ameliorate the effects of social injustice.
Indeed, it is questionable whether similarity of outcome is even
relevant to the design of a process which seeks to separate out the
innocent before charge and to make possible the trial of those who
appear guilty. The elimination of disabling discrimination is the
primary goal of the Poverty Program, the Civil Rights Act, and numerous and expanding services in vocational rehabilitation, school assistance, and medical care. It is one of the goals of the Criminal
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Justice Act, which recognizes that counsel make a positive and
essential contribution to the further separation of the innocent from
the guilty in adversary proceedings and to appropriate dispositions.
Society gains in all these. But absolute equality of result could be
achieved in the investigatory stage-after a crime has been committed
and before a trial is possible-only by deliberately foregoing reliable
evidence and releasing guilty men. Acquittal of the guilty does not
promote social justice.
Moreover, acquittal of the guilty in the name of equality of
treatment may prevent our achieving other, more fundamental goals
also contained in the ideal of equal justice. Fairness is owed to those
who obey the law, and to those guilty who are convicted. Many
undergo hardship and rigorous self-discipline while observing the
restraints of the law, and are unjustly disadvantaged if some are
permitted to break the law with impunity. And to a man convicted
because he was careless in leaving a fingerprint, or too poor to change
his tell-tale clothes after a crime, there is no more galling governmental act than the release of one who betrayed himself because he
was careless in answering a question. Furthermore, in the elimination
of questioning a high price would be paid by the innocent who are
exculpated early in the criminal process by police questioning, and
by those who appear at first to deserve a more serious charge than is
eventually filed after questioning. The introduction of counsel at this
early stage would not, as you suggest, promote this screening, for there
must be the possibility of an incriminating as well as an exculpatory
outcome if there is to be imaginative and energetic investigatory
questioning.
The interests are subtle and complex. When analyzing our system
in terms of the concept of equality, it seems to me wholly arbitrary to
choose as groups for comparison only some of the poor guilty and
some of the rich guilty.
In any event, I do not think the dissimilarities in outcome for rich
and poor are so great as you suggest. The failure to arrest a Board of
Directors for questioning about an antitrust violation does not strike
me as an example of unequal treatment. The investigations of antitrust violations and of violent urban crime are simply not comparable,
and the anonymity and mobility of modern urban life often do not
permit postponement of arrest when crimes of violence are involved.
Moreover, when any crime is in issue those who have respectability at
stake, and who could have a lawyer at their command, cannot afford
to appear guilty. Calling a lawyer for protection from investigation, or
refusing to answer questions, does often give the appearance of guilt,
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and as a consequence the rich will often talk, and, if guilty, will often
provide incriminating evidence.
You are right, I fear, that "professionals who engage in organized
crime" frequently succeed in avoiding conviction under our system.
But I have never understood why the gangster should be made the
model and all others raised, in the name of equality, to his level of
success in suppressing evidence. This is simply the proposition that if
some can beat the rap, all must beat the rap. I see no reason to distort
the whole of the criminal process in this fashion. Because we cannot
solve all crimes and convict all criminals is no reason to release those
guilty whom we can convict.
Discussions such as ours, now stimulated by the American Law
Institute's draft code, are being generally undertaken with regard
to the design of our whole system of criminal law. My chief concern
is that in seeking to achieve the freedom, security, legal and social
justice that are at stake in our conclusions, we do not permit the real
issues to be obscured. If the issue is conviction of the innocent, then
we must specifically examine that. If it is the coercion of the socially
disadvantaged, then we must discuss that carefully and realistically.
If it is the meaning of the privilege against self-incrimination, or the
likely effect, and proper function of counsel, then we must turn to that
on its merits. But we cannot afford merely to draw out the logic of
unexamined assumptions. The stakes are too high.
I have no objection, of course, to your releasing your letter to
anyone you wish, and should you desire you may append this reply
to it.
Sincerely,
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Attorney General

HeinOnline -- 54 Ky. L.J. 494 1965-1966

APPENDIX C
MEMORAXDUM *

To: Reporters and Members of the Advisory Committee on the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure of the American Law Institute.
From: Anthony G. Amsterdam, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
Date: July 6, 1965
Gentlemen:
You have all seen copies of the correspondence between Chief
Judge Bazelon and the Attorney General of the United States on the
subject of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. Being
deeply troubled by the Attorney General's letter-as by Preliminary
Draft No. I of the Code-I make bold to enclose a copy of my own
letter to Judge Bazelon, containing my reflections on the subject.
Although my letter is primarily responsive to the Attorney Generals,
it has sufficient pertinency to the Code, I think, to justify my troubling
you ,ith it. I am sending a copy to the Attorney General as well.
I should add one comment. I see the issues presented by the Code
and by the Attorney General's letter as very different issues than those
which are presented by the judicial decisions referred to by the
Attorney General on [p. 491] of his letter. Evaluation of the propriety
of a constitutional decision by an appellate court must always take
account of the limited function of the Constitution in our legal order,
and of the limited role of courts interpreting the Constitution in
prescribing norms for our democratic society. While I myself do not
think that the Supreme Court of the United States has gone too far
in its decisions setting constitutional limits of permissible police procedures-particularly in view of the default of state legislatures,
administrators and courts generally in the area-I can understand the
cries of those who think that the Court has made the restraints of the
Constitution too tight. I can understand them, that is, insofar as they
rest upon the proposition that not every procedural safeguard which
is desirable is thereby constitutionally compelled. But the converse
of this proposition should also not be forgotten by those who have
invoked it in criticizing the Court. A procedural safeguard which is not
so fundamental as to find a place among the limitations which the
* Only personal references have been deleted. [Ed.]
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Constitution imposes upon all the organs of government is not thereby
an undesirable safeguard for adoption by a civilized and self-confident
society among whose aspirations is a high regard for the individual.
As I see the Code, it attempts to state not the most repressive constitutionally permissible procedures, but those procedures which
should commend themselves for general adoption today. Similarly,
the Attorney Generals letter purports to speak, I think, on the level
of "ought," not on the level of "must." And on the level of "ought," for
the reasons stated in my letter, I can understand neither the Attorney
General nor the Code.
July 2, 1965
Honorable David L. Bazelon
United States Court of Appeals
United States District Courthouse
Constitution Avenue and John Marshall Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
...

I thought I had become pretty tough in the gut by now-if I

had not, the callousness of the ALI "Model Code would have made
me so-but I retain enough squeamishness to be shocked by General
Katzenbach's letter. Surely it is frightening self-deception in the highest legal officer of the United States to think that he is "recognizing
our actual practices and inquiring into the reasons for them" (p. 490),
that he is eschewing "the logic of unexamined assumptions" (p. 494),
while he reasons from such premises as "We are not so civilized that
we can afford to abandon deterrence as a goal of our criminal law" (p.
492)-as though we knew anything about the deterrent efficacy of the
criminal sanction, particularly in its operation upon classes driven by
our society into open and not unrighteous hostility to law-or "the
rehabilitative correctional system, which is appropriately designed to
ameliorate the effects of social injustice" (ibid.)-as though our prisons
were not, more than our slums, cesspools of social injustice and
breeding grounds of crime. I sadly fear that the Attorney General
is selective in the assumptions he will and those he will not examine.
I must pass over, dubitante, his assertion that "the dissimilarities
in outcome for rich and poor are [not] so great" ( p. 493). In my own
experience, first as a prosecutor in the District of Columbia and now
as a consultant and litigator for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund,
such a suggestion is sheer Alice in Wonderland. But my experience
is doubtless far more limited than that of the General and, in any
event, this factual quibble is mooted by the General's overriding view
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that equality in treatment of criminal suspects is a value of small
concern. His letter never quite states this in words, but since the
obvious generalizations which he does state-for example, "I do not
believe that regulation . . . of investigatory procedures should have
as its purpose to remedy all the inequalities which may exist in our
society . . . to the exclusion of all other purposes and values . . "
(p. 491)-are neither responsive to your letter nor adequate to support
the General's reasoning from them unless they mean something cruder
than they say. I take them to mean what they must mean in order to
take the General where he goes. And this is, in short, that equality is a
pretty unimportant value in the criminal process.
I cannot agree with this, for two reasons. The first is that we are
not talking simply about equality at large, and certainly not about
"similarity of outcome" (p. 492), as the Attorney General suggests. We
are talking about equality of access to fundamental protections in the
criminal process, of equality in the procedures through which some
outcome is reached. We are talking about equal availability of the
privilege against self-incrimination, of the right against detention on
suspicion, of insulation against the fear and coercive pressure of what
the General euphemistically calls "imaginative and energetic investigatory questioning" (p. 493). The General's proposition is that it is
unimportant that these protections are unavailable to those too ignorant
to claim them and too poor to engage a lawyer for their vindication.
That makes them unavailable, by the General's own admission, to
the classes of persons most likely to be proscuted for crime (see p. 492),
unavailable, in short, in most of the cases in which they were
designed to operate. I am not yet so cynical as to believe that the
statesmen and judges who expressed the high aspirations of our
society in these guarantees mean them only as window-dressing for a
system in which the accepted and ordinary practice was that they
were to be lost by ignorant and involuntary waiver. Nor can I forget
that equality of procedure is synonymous with regularity of procedure
and that in a world where even the best of men (among whom I shall
include arguendo the police of Chicago, Illinois, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and of Philadelphia, Mississippi) sometimes surrender to
the delusion of infallibility, regularity of procedure is all that protects
the citizen against conviction of crime by the policeman and imposition
of punishment through "investigatory" detention and brow-beating
interrogation.
More important, I fear the Attorney General forgets that even
judicial conviction and commitment of criminals is itself only a means,
not an end. The end is a safe, secure society for all of us who live in

HeinOnline -- 54 Ky. L.J. 497 1965-1966

KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL

it. That end is more efficiently attained, I am sure the General would
agree, by encouraging citizen cooperation to law than by perfecting
the means for apprehending and punishing the disobedient. For the
most part, encouraging obedience and punishing disobedience are
mutually consistent, even mutually supporting means. They cease to
be consistent when the powers given officials to apprehend and punish
the disobedient are so unconstrained that their exercise arouses citizen
resentment and contempt for law. Nothing so much arouses resentment
and contempt for law as arbitrariness and inequality of treatment at
the hands of officers of the law. The observation in your letter (p. 486)
that the police are far more likely to use the powers given them
against the poor Negro than against the criminal who is white of collar
and of face is-you will pardon my saying so-not original with you.
I have heard the same thing said, in different words, by poor Negroes
in Chester, Pennsylvania and in Jackson, Mississippi. Some of them
were engaged in peaceful civil rights demonstrations; some were
throwing rocks. The Attorney General fears that "the judges have left
the people behind" (p. 491). I have no doubt that "the people" of whom
the Attorney General speaks are the comfortable middle and upper
classes-to which both the Attorney General and I belong-who
imagine themselves always as potential victims of crime, never as
potential victims of a police investigation. But the courts have not
left this "people" behind so far as the police have left behind the
Negroes in Washington, D.C., the Mexicans in Texas, the Puerto Ricans
in New York City. The decisions of the judges have attempted to set
bounds for the conduct of the police which, if accepted by the police,
may go some distance toward causing the police, and the law, to be
more acceptable to those whose conduct the criminal law, in the main,
aims to regulate. The essence of the decisions is regularity and
equality. The ALI subordinates those values and the Attorney General
appears to debunk them-both, doubtless, in the view that a hardheaded practicality compels their recognition as illusions. To me,
nothing is so infuriating as this sort of half-sighted practicality. I am
myself middling law-abiding; but if anything could put me in the
ranks of the rock-throwers, it would be the conviction that our high
public officers, such as the Attorney General of the United States,
charged with responsibility as the legal representative of all "the
people," entertain an indifference verging on contempt for our
society's commitment to equality and impartiality in the administration
of the criminal law....
Best regards,
Anthony G. Amsterdam
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